An important piece of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the 1967 Arab-Israeli war also known as the 6 days war. This was not a war between the Palestinians and Israelis, but rather a war between Israel and a collection of Arab states. This would lead to Israel taking the Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Gaza Strip. This article answers the question of what led to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war using documents released by the State Department and CIA. Most of this article will be using the CIA document “Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War” as its source due to the fact it covers the timeline of events. The current understanding of this conflict is that Israel was responding to Egyptian mobilization in the Sinai, and launched a pre-emptive invasion. Holding the position Israel was in effect acting defensively.
In the months coming up to the war, terrorists from Syria and Jordan (such as the Fedayeen) would do raids against Israel, in return, Israel launched air strikes and counter-raids, later the Syrian prime minister announced he would not take measures to curb the Fedayeen. In early 1967, Israeli and Syrian exchanged artillery blows, and Israel launched deep air raids into Syria, overpowering the Arab state, a CIA report saying:
“In early 1967 the tension along the Israeli-Syrian border was high as artillery exchanges increased. Syria (clearly not strong enough to handle Israel alone)… On 7 April 1967, following a border exchange of fire, Israel launched the deepest air strikes into Syria up to that time. This may have marked a major change in Israel’s retaliatory policy, as its pilots were authorized to penetrate deep into Syria.”
*Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 3-4
The Soviets were influential during this time, attempting to bring a strong alliance between Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria. Because Israel overpowered Syria, the Soviets put pressure on the Nasser-led Egyptian government, with the CIA saying:
“The 1967 April battle revealed to the Soviets and the Syrians the vulnerability of Syria to Israeli attacks, and the Soviets may have concluded that in order to deter Israel, Egypt must make a firmer commitment to Syria.”
*Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 4
The Soviets had begun giving intelligence reports of the Israeli concentration of troops along the Syrian border, as a result, the Egyptian and Syrian governments became concerned about an Israeli attack, Egypt had begun mobilizing forces to defend Syria from an Israeli invasion and ordered United Nations Emergency Forces out of all Egyptian land. There are questions of whether or not these reports were to be believed and if Israel had started rumors to create false reports, with the CIA saying:
“The origin of the report is not clear; it apparently did not originate with either the Syrians or Egyptians, both of whom were given the information by the Soviets. It is possible that the Israelis themselves floated the rumor hoping-to induce the Soviets to persuade the Syrians to stop their provocative actions. In any event, the Soviets did not appear particularly concerned about establishing the validity of the report. They had made similar unfounded claims in October 1966 and February 1967 and were the main disseminators of this report.”
*Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 4
On May 22, 1967, Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to ships of all other countries bringing strategic cargoes to Israel, the next day the CIA had made reports showing Israel could handle and take land in a four-front war. Israel issued a warning on May 26 that it would not wait indefinitely for the Egyptian embargo to cease and for the Arab troops stationed at its borders to leave. At that point, the Israeli military was virtually completely mobilized. The Israeli stance that Egyptian interfering with Israeli ships in the Gulf would be viewed as an act of hostility, as reiterated by the Israeli Prime Minister the next day. At the end of May, Israel made demands to prevent an “inevitable” military conflict; Egypt’s troop concentration near Israel’s borders had to be removed, the embargo had to be lifted, and Israel’s borders had to be protected against terrorist attacks from their respective country. On June 5, Israel had done a pre-emptive invasion of Egypt, alleging that an Egyptian invasion of Israel was going to occur, citing the mobilization of Egyptian airforces and troops. However, it seems Israel had ulterior motives for doing so, such as Israel had received intelligence from the CIA that the Egyptian movements in the Sainai were defensive, and also receiving intelligence that Israel could defend a four-front war:
“Egyptian military moves in Sinai, as well as Arab troop movements elsewhere were defensive and for political effect… Based on this analysis, which was delivered to the White House ten days before the war, the President and his senior advisers ‘adopted a policy posture in consonance with the intelligence judgment’ and decided against a heavy involvement in the war. They also advised Israel against initiating hostilities, since Egypt’s military moves were defensive in nature. Furthermore, the administration told the Israelis that ‘if they chose to take the military initiative, they would have to go it alone’… Israel fired the first shots, although it claimed it was responding to a movement by Egyptian air and ground forces—a claim that was refuted by DI analysis.”
*The June 1967 War and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 205
“[Israel could] defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts . . . or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth.”
*Policy and Intelligence –The Arab and Israeli War, pp. 3
The analysis referenced in the quote showed “the presently available information suggests that Israel fired the first shots today” suggesting Israel was the aggressor (“Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Current Intelligence”). The likely reasons for launching the attack were given by Walt Rostow, the U.S. president’s Special Assistant:
“We think it [the Israeli pre-emptive attack] is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser.”
*Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson
Nasser and the Egyptian Government at the time was caught off guard, believing that Israel would not invade without US support. Nasser also believed if Israel were to invade, they could hold off the Israeli invasion long enough to get Soviet supplies, this is likely the reason why Nasser didn’t immediately comply with Israeli demands. Nasser was also influenced by the gain of popularity within and outside of Egypt, these quotes by the CIA and Walt Rostow show this:
“This statement, together with Nasser’s claims regarding Egyptian strength vis-a-vis Israel, suggests that Nasser’s expectations of Soviet support in the event of war included only materiel and the necessary Soviet actions to deter U.S. intervention in Israel’s behalf. Nasser surely did not anticipate what in fact occurred—a disastrous five-day war. He [Nasser] more likely foresaw a prolonged conflict in which Soviet aid-in the form of military equipment, not actual physical support-might well play an important part… He [Nasser] apparently felt that the United States could restrain Israel and also seemed confident that the Arabs could cope with Israel militarily if necessary. Nasir’s confidence in Egypt’s military capability seems to have been at least partially shared by the Soviets… l The Soviets overestimated the Arab ability to employ its military strength, and… the Soviets had made a bad estimate of Arab capabilities… However, the most important Soviet error at this point would appear to have been their failure to foresee an Israeli attack… The timing of the attack certainly surprised the Arabs. After the war Nasser blamed his unpreparedness on the fact that the United States had indicated it would try to restrain Israel. And Nasser, as well as the Soviets, apparently was convinced Israel would not attack without U.S. approval. ”
*Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 11, 13
“Nasser has already had significant success in exploiting the crisis to restore his influence and acceptance at home and abroad as leader of all the Arabs. He probably realizes that these gains would be quickly reversed if he were humiliated or suffered military defeat. He probably calculates, however, that his interests would be satisfied by any resolution of the crisis other than humiliation or defeat. He may not regard military victory over Israel as essential to his ends.”
*Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson
In summary, this analysis shows the current understanding of the conflict as shown by CIA and State Department documents is incorrect. The information does show, however, that Israel had wanted to invade Egypt, especially since they received reports showing they could beat Egypt and the surrounding Arab countries, doing so unprovoked however would look bad internationally. This would give plausibility to the idea that the origin of Soviet reports came from Israel, as a way to gain justification for a pre-emptive invasion of Egypt.
“Arab-Israeli war of 1967.” U.S. Department of State Archive, 20 Jan. 2009, doi:2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/97187.htm.
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Current Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, 1967, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d169.
The Arab-Israeli War: Who Fired the First Shot
Nakhleh, Emile A. THE JUNE 1967 AND OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WARS. Central Intelligence Agency, 2016, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/THE%20JUNE%201967%20AND%20OCTOBER%5B14706416%5D.pdf.
Policy and Intelligence –The Arab and Israeli War. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01762A000500040020-8.pdf.
Rostow, Walt. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson. Washington: Office of the Historian | Foreign Service Institute, 1967, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61.
Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Central Intelligence Agency, 2017, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/soviet%20policy%20and%20the%20196%5B15347797%5D.pdf.
Nasir is used in the document, in the article it is changed to Nasser
